Posted: September 8, 2013 | Author: Tom | Filed under: Uncategorized | Tags: American Exceptionalism, Barack Obama, Bashar Al-Assad, John Kerry, Syria, War Powers Act |
“Well, here’s another nice mess you’ve gotten me into!” — Oliver Hardy
It is hard to know where to begin as events continue to unfold concerning possible United States military action against the Syrian regime of Bashar Al-Assad. The bottom line is getting significantly obscured in all the political rhetoric within our country and without. To me, however, it is still necessary for the world — and as the leader of the world, for the United States — to take action against Bashar’s regime.
As I write, I think of all the things that have gone wrong in the way that we’ve approached this case and how we may be able to rectify the many mistakes. But in the end, that is all water under the bridge. The real question is “what happens now?” There are many questions that cannot be answered and thus create an aura of doubt about the feasibility of taking action. Not to be cavalier, but it is also possible to be stymied by over-thinking all of the issues and questions. As a mentor of mine used to say it becomes “paralysis by analysis.” Continuing to press for every conceivable scenario and pushing to eliminate all of the risk may even be a strategy by some of those opposed to military action. To them, too many unknowns means we should not take action. However, if that was the basis for all decision-making, then few things would get accomplished, especially in a context such as this one. That is not to say that planners should not be trying to answer all of those questions. As I pointed out in my first post on this subject on 28 August, there must be a plan B — branches and sequels as they are known to planners. These are important when the operation is a success (the need to seize the initiative and to take advantage of unexpected opportunities when they arise) and they are critical if the operation is less successful (how do we still accomplish the mission while lessening or eliminating the problems standing in the way). Keep trying to get the answers, keep working on contingencies and “what ifs” but at some point it is time to act.
I am not sure exactly why President Obama made the choice to get Congress involved in the decision to act. Much has been (and surely will be) written about whether or not it was necessary, supports or undermines the Constitution, or jeopardizes the chances for success. My own view is that it was not necessary. Significant precedence exists for the president to initiate military action without a vote from Congress. Indeed, in his own administration he took action in Libya, and on a much larger scale than anticipated here, without it. Clearly, a president should consult with Congressional leaders, provide them with a rationale, share intelligence leading to the decision and otherwise include the legislative branch of Congress. A vote, however, creates an entirely different dynamic and significantly complicates the issue on many levels.
Foremost among those complications is that the nature and ramifications of what was going to be a relatively (if there is such a thing in warfare) straight forward, short duration operation achieving tactical surprise if not operational or strategic surprise have changed. The public, our legislators, anyone discussing the issue now talk about “going to war.” We were never going to war with Syria and the vote in Congress is not a declaration of war. But merely talking in those terms raises the stakes to a level not in the original concept. (At this point, let me say I do not and will not gloss over the dangers of combat. When bullets are flying, those on the scene don’t care if we are technically at war or not, they are in danger. I remember Beirut in 1983 where the Reagan Administration would not authorize hazardous duty pay — commonly referred to as combat pay — because of fears it would trigger the War Powers Act. We were not amused.)
The “Goldilocks Solution” I referred to in my 31 August post becomes increasingly difficult to achieve (not too little, not too much, but just right). However, we must still try. Politicians that argued that President Obama does not understand or believe in “American Exceptionalism” are now arguing that the United States should not be out front in holding Bashar accountable for his violation of international law. Really? We are the world’s leader militarily, economically, and in this case most importantly morally or we are not. We cannot have it both ways. To me this case is all about demonstrating that we are serious when we say that certain actions are totally unacceptable and that we will not stand by and let them happen. Deterrence does not work if there is no consequence for the action being deterred. Our nation is a leader in putting a moral force behind international law and therefore we must act.
Continued references to our involvement in Iraq under President George W. Bush are not relevant in this case. It is wholly different. I have not heard of a single member of the House or the Senate say that the evidence of Syrian use of chemical weapons (probably Sarin) is false or shaky or insufficient. When the president addresses the nation this Tuesday, I hope that besides laying out the moral arguments for our involvement that he also includes the facts of the case — the surety that caused him to embark on this course in the first place.
Whether or not to act and if so in what manner is not a trivial discussion. It is a weighty decision and I appreciate that members of the public and the Congress have legitimate concerns. They should ask the hard questions. To me, it seems that most of the opposition to military action falls into roughly three categories. Some merely oppose anything that this president puts forward. Period. Thankfully, in this case I think that number is very small. Others oppose military action because they feel that it would not do any good or merely “make things worse.” I appreciate this line of argument but I think it naive. What could be worse than what is already going on and will go on. Could things get worse? They could. Will they get worse if we don’t act? They will. A third group, and in the Congress right now I think the largest group, feel that we do need to do something, but are not convinced that we will achieve our aims by taking military action. This is where the Obama Administration must make its case. To be sure, I do not think that they have made it to date. Secretary of State Kerry has been the most eloquent in delineating why now and why in this way. So far I have been unimpressed by General Dempsey (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs) and Secretary of Defense Hagel. As the experts, they should be able to make the case with a clearly stated, straight forward mission statement and define the intent. Why are we doing it and what do we accomplish? I haven’t seen them do it, although they are getting closer with the aim to “degrade and deter” future Syrian use of chemical weapons.
There is a lot riding on this decision, and not just for those that must go in harm’s way. I think our credibility as a nation is at stake and non-action will come back to haunt us in the future as other bad actors feel emboldened to create mischief. Our past history demonstrates that foreign leaders can badly miscalculate the meaning of the contentious American brand of democracy. Should this happen again with North Korea or Iran or even Syria (again) we will rise to the occasion as we have so many times before. But it will be at a much greater loss of lives and treasure than would have been risked had we acted now instead of later.
So what will happen? I don’t know. My best guess is that the House will vote down the resolution and the Senate will pass it. If that is the case, the President will go ahead and act. If both the House and Senate vote down the resolution, the President will not act.
Either way between now and the beginning of October with so many domestic and international issues pending for our legislators to resolve it is going to be exciting. Or as Bette Davis said in the movie All About Eve, “Fasten your seatbelts, it’s going to be a bumpy night.”
Posted: August 31, 2013 | Author: Tom | Filed under: Uncategorized | Tags: Barack Obama, Gulf War, Iraq, Syria, Weapons of Mass Destruction |
What a difference 72 hours makes. In many respects nothing fundamentally changed, but like so many complicated issues, this one got even more complicated.
I doubt anyone, especially Prime Minister David Cameron, expected the British Parliament to vote against action in Syria. In my view, this was an internal political move rather than a repudiation of the alliance with the United States or an acceptance of the Syrian use of chemical weapons. They have been, and still are, mad as hell about the United Kingdom’s involvement in Iraq, and the way that it was sold to them, and they”aren’t going to take it anymore.” I doubt that Thursday’s vote is the final word from the British about their involvement or lack of involvement. As further information becomes available to them and to the world about what occurred in Syria (and may occur again) it would not surprise me to see them come on board in the end.
I am surprised by President Obama’s statement today (Saturday). I have not yet had the opportunity to fully digest it. None-the-less I find it confusing for him to say that the United States is going to take military action against Bashar’s regime — and my interpretation of his words is that we are definitely going to take action — but then seemingly leave it up to a vote by the Congress. It is all backwards. If even only for appearances sake, he should make the case for military action, rally Congress for support and an open-ended resolution to use “all necessary means” and then announce a strike or other military action. And oh by the way, he has now given the appearance of providing Congress veto power over his already announced decision to take military action.
While I understand that there is not necessarily a definitive timeline to act, the traditional statement that works best in these circumstances is something along the lines of the United States “will take action at a time and place of our choosing.” President Obama left me with the impression that “we’ll get around to it.” To me, if the case is as compelling as it increasingly appears to be, and ten days have already elapsed, then I don’t see why he is waiting for Congress to return to Washington at the regularly scheduled time (9 September) to get going on this. Call them back to Washington now and get on with it.
Of course I may be reading more into this than is there. Perhaps consultations will be sufficient and he won’t wait until they return to Washington to have a debate and a vote on the issue. Additionally, waiting another ten days (or more) may have the side benefit of giving the Administration time to continue to build its case for action and to bring more international support to the equation. So, maybe there is some method to the madness, but I still wonder if the President is getting very good advice on how to put this all together for the country’s consideration.
On top of all that, as was demonstrated in the United Kingdom, there remains a very deep distrust of “evidence” of WMD and its persuasiveness for taking action. Personally, I do not see this as being the same — either in scale or in terms of what has happened — as the events in Iraq leading to Gulf War II under President George W. Bush. I think that by invading Iraq we took our eye off the ball (Afghanistan) and went after Saddam because that Administration thought they saw an opportunity to get rid of him “easily.” Nothing in warfare is as easy as it looks. Regardless, those events, and the justification for going to war in that case, have poisoned the well this time around. No one wants to get fooled again. However, I believe that this time around what we see is what we get — Bashar’s regime used chemical weapons, probably Sarin gas, against its own population and killed approximately 1400 people. He may well do it again.
As I noted in my previous post on 28 August, I still do not have a clear idea of what the President intends to accomplish with a military strike. I support a strike. Like it or not future deterrence depends on demonstrating a willingness and capability to act as we say we will act. I am not a war monger. I have serious reservations about any military action and very great concerns about what will come of this particular action. Once underway, there is always the chance for things to go awry. But in this case I believe it is important to do something that demonstrably holds Syrian leaders accountable, I just do not yet understand what the President has in mind that accomplishes that goal.
Many current and former military leaders are expressing serious concerns over the use of force in Syria. Primarily, this is because there is still no full explanation of what we want to accomplish and, as I’ve said before, what is it exactly that we want to see as a result of the military action. In my view, we probably cannot do much more than degrade the WMD capability of Syria and also send a message to those responsible that their personal well-being is in danger if it happens again. I think the critics fear both what happens if we take “too much” action and equally fear what happens if we take “too little” action. As with Goldilocks, we need to get his one “just right.”
So far the President has said that Bashar crossed a red line and that we therefore need to do something about it. That is a political statement that does not translate to military action. The arm-chair strategists are nervous because they don’t know what is that the President wants — “what do you want us to do?” I say this only a bit facetiously, but let me give you an example.
In the lead up to Gulf War I, President George H. W. Bush said following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that “this will not stand.” Got it. As military planners, it was necessary to take that statement and put it into concrete terms that the forces that had to go out and do something could understand and work towards. In this case it would “not stand” because the goal was to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restore the legitimate government (the one that existed before the invasion) of Kuwait. It was not to over throw Saddam or occupy Iraq or bring democracy to Iraq or a number of other unrelated actions. It was a clear and precise formula for what needed to be done and everyone could clearly understand what things would look like when it was over.
It is easy to pick targets and talk weapon systems and the like. Some people consider it fun and others make a lot of money talking about it on TV. That stuff is relatively easy for those in the know but it has no relevancy to the bigger picture. What is important is the mission and the end state. Figure that out and the tacticians and military commanders on the scene know what targets to hit with what weapons. Let the professionals do their job. But to do it well, they need to know what we want it to look like in the end.
It does not appear to me that the hard stuff has yet been addressed. I hope I am wrong, but we are still waiting to hear what the end state should be. How do we know when we are finished?
I am also sure that Congress, which apparently cannot take anything seriously during its five week vacation that takes precedence over the well-being of the country, will make it even muddier.
Let’s get on with it.
Posted: August 28, 2013 | Author: Tom | Filed under: Uncategorized | Tags: Bashar Al-Assad, Chemical Weapons, Credibility, Deterrence, Syria, US Military Attacks. Weapons of Mass Destruction |
Even a casual look at the news over the last few days reveals that the United States is about to undertake a military action against the Syrian regime in response to the Syrian’s near certain use of chemical weapons against its own population.
The opinion pieces and talking heads on TV, many of whom are former military officers or Defense Department civilian leaders, are full of cautions about embarking upon a military action without fulling understanding what the results might be. They are right to be cautious. Unfortunately, the United States is in a no-win situation. We cannot draw a clear “red line” that we would respond harshly should Bashar Al-Assad or his regime order the use of chemical weapons, or as they are commonly called, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and not do so. In order to credibly issue other such warnings in the future we must take action now. Deterrence is totally dependent on the credibility of a nation’s stated reaction to the act to be deterred. Every so often, nations need to act in order to show that their threatened response has credibility — that they actually can and will do what they say. On the other hand, there is no desire for a long-term United States military involvement there, yet the situation is going to become a significant long-term problem for the United States should we act.
I am guessing that the Obama Administration drew the red line over Syrian use of WMD to show that they were concerned with developments in that country and that we would not ignore what happens there. By taking a moral stand we could demonstrate that we actually cared what happens there. I do not think that the Obama Administration believed that Bashar would actually use them. After all, large-scale use of chemical weapons has not been done since the end of World War I. When nearly the entire world agrees that such use is beyond the realm of warfare, we need to take action. The question then becomes, what kind of action and how does it end?
The two most similar situations from the not too distant past are Operation Desert Fox against Iraq in December 1998 and the NATO involvement in Kosovo which began in March 1999. Both are instructive for what did and did not happen. In 1998, the United States and the United Kingdom began four days of Tomahawk missile strikes and bombing attacks from naval and air forces. The action was in response to Saddam’s refusal to comply with United Nations resolutions concerning WMD in Iraq. The Kosovo action was also a combination of NATO missile and air attacks to stop atrocities being carried out by Yugoslav troops against Kosovo civilians and fighters. After over three months of the air operation, the Yugoslavs agreed to withdraw and to allow NATO troops under United Nations auspices to enter the country as peacekeepers.
There are elements in both operations that reflect the current situation. In Iraq we thought we were dealing with WMD. In Kosovo we were dealing with mass killings and atrocities against civilians. Both exist in the current Syrian situation, but the context is totally different.
Operation Desert Fox was never intended to be an extended operation. The stated intent was to degrade Iraq’s ability to produce and use WMD. The United States never set out to totally eliminate any and all stockpiles or production facilities.
The air operation in Kosovo was intended to be of a similar nature — a short duration operation to convince Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to withdraw. He and his cohorts turned out to be much tougher than expected as it took him over three months to get the message. Most analysts feel that the air operation would have continued indefinitely if the threat of placing NATO forces on the ground in Kosovo had not been made. British Prime Minister Tony Blair was at the forefront of publicly pushing for a ground operation and Milosevic finally caught on that he could not last forever.
In Syria we have a totally different situation. In 1998 Saddam was not using WMD against his own population like Bashar is now doing. In Kosovo Milosevic was in essence leading an external force into Kosovo and it was possible to withdraw to allow for peacekeepers to enter. There are no external forces to withdraw from Syria — they are caught in a civil war. No credible leader is pushing for putting troops into that country. So what happens now in Syria?
Every military planner knows that no military action should go forward without a clear understanding of the mission. A mission statement must clearly answer the “who, what, where and when” questions of the action. However, most importantly, it also answers the “why” and provides the desired end state. We are going to go in and blow things up and kill people — so why do that and what should it look like when we are finished? The crafting of the mission is crucial to success but not easily accomplished. Everything else stems from this including the analysis of alternative courses of action. It’s impossible to know what to do if you don’t know why you are doing it. We should expect the President to articulate this for the nation just prior to or coincident with the beginning of hostilities. There are signs this may happen soon.
When choosing a course of action one must ask several questions relating to the mission. Is it suitable (does it accomplish the goal)? Is it feasible (are the resources available sufficient)? Is it acceptable (is the level of risk involved worth the payoff)? Is it consistent (is it in keeping with our core values and objectives)? We need to know that all aspects of the situation have been thoroughly reviewed.
Finally, planners must have alternative courses of action ready to go — a “Plan B” if you will. Nothing is certain in life and it is even less certain in warfare. Planners can project what will happen but cannot be certain that the opponent will react as expected. They must have alternatives ready to go and have thoroughly thought through the “next step” or the mission will not be accomplished.
So what will do in Syria? Perhaps a more important question is what should we do in Syria? My honest answer is “I don’t know.” Unfortunately, that is not an acceptable answer.
My guess is that the mission will be similar to Operation Desert Fox in 1998 against Iraq. The goal will be to degrade the ability of the Syrian forces to use chemical weapons again in the future. They will not be able to prevent future use, they will only be able to make it harder for them to do so and also to make it “personal.” We will not threaten to put troops into Syria as was done in Kosovo because that is a step too far for both the will of the nation and our national interests. Therefore the plan will not be for a long-term campaign, but rather a limited action with limited objectives. In other words, to send a message that certain actions in Syria are unacceptable (and perhaps just as importantly, send a message to other bad actors in the world that we will act as promised if they cross the line). Whether or not Bashar gets the message is a different question and we may let loose the dogs of war without really knowing what will happen in the end. An unsettling situation to say the least.
Here is the rough outline of what I think will happen. There will be a limited air operation involving Tomahawk missiles and aircraft from the United States, United Kingdom and some other token NATO involvement including some Turkish and French forces. All of the media attention is on the ships and submarines in the Mediterranean but there will be larger air forces launched from Cyprus and Incirlik Turkey among other places. I would expect token involvement from Arab states — probably a few aircraft from Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
The planners will expect the operation to last 3-5 days and then they will re-group to assess whether their goals were met. The operation will begin at night, perhaps as early as this Friday night — a weekend night in the Arab world — in the hopes of tactical surprise and also limiting civilian casualties. The exact timing may depend on whether or not the United Nations observers currently in country are gone. They will not hit the chemical weapons storage sites. They will try to take out the means of delivering those weapons such as launchers and command and control sites. They will not target Bashar or his family but it is likely that they will target key military commanders that oversaw the use of the weapons. I am sure that we have fairly good intelligence as to who those people are at the senior tactical levels of command and we will send a “this one’s for you” type message that things will get very bad for any other military leaders that decide to use such weapons.
Just as in the previously discussed operations, Russia will voice its objections in the strongest possible terms, perhaps even threatening some kind of retaliation. Just as in those previous operations, in the end they will be unable to influence the events or prevent them from happening.
There are some serious unknowns to me that I hope the planners and decision makers have a handle on. Foremost among those is whether or not Bashar thinks that his end is near and that he has nothing to lose — thus ordering ever more extensive use of the chemical weapons. This is where the success of the initial strikes will be critical in eliminating the means to deliver those weapons and whether the message gets through to subordinate commanders that their own health and well-being is in jeopardy from us if they follow those orders. Word of further defections by senior leaders in the regime will be a good measure of effectiveness as to whether the “message” hit home.
In the end, the United States and western powers must do something or our future credibility in such matters is seriously undermined. A quick, short duration attack focused on disrupting the Syrian military’s use of WMD in the future seems to be the best short-term approach. Only after that will we know what the future holds for Syria.
Tom
Into The Fray 
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